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It is not true that successive groups of researchers from academia and research institutions—scientists who served on panels of the US National Academy
of Sciences (NAS)—were duped into supporting a linear no-threshold model (LNT) by the opinions expressed in the genetic panel section of the 1956
“BEAR I” report. Successor reports had their own views of the LNT model, relying on mouse and human data, not fruit ﬂy data. Nor was the 1956 report
biased and corrupted, as has been charged in an article by Edward J. Calabrese in this journal. With or without BEAR I, the LNT model would likely have
been accepted in the US for radiation protection purposes in the 1950's.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
I write about an article in volume 142 of the journal, pages
432–442, (Calabrese, 2015), entitled, “On the origins of the linear
no-threshold (LNT) dogma by means of untruths, artful dodges
and blind faith.” The acerbic title hints at the content that is to
follow, namely repeated ad hominem attacks on the actions and
motives of historical ﬁgures, charitable and scientiﬁc institutions,
including the Rockefeller Foundation, past committees of the US
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), especially the 1956 genetics
panel report in the ﬁrst Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation
(BEAR-I) report (NAS, 1956), as well as an NAS president, a pre-
sident of the American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence, and a president of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Re-
search – all persons and groups who supported the linear non-
threshold model of radiation health effects in any way or did not
disavow it. In sentence after sentence, the author deviates from
norms for scientiﬁc research journals, suggesting conspiracies,
relying on speculation, and attributing motives and states of mind
(see Table 1).
Alarm bells should go off for every reader, when an advocate
for a minority theory declares that scientists and institutions are
deceitful, complicit, and/or corrupt. The minority theory in this
case is radiation “hormesis,” which posits that low doses of io-
nizing radiation have positive health effects.
A key thesis of the article is that successive groups of re-
searchers from academia and research institutions—scientists who
served on panels of the NAS—were duped into supporting an LNT
or quasi-LNT model by the opinions expressed in a biased and
corrupted genetic panel section of the 1956 BEAR I report. As
discussed in what follows, I ﬁnd this extraordinary claim to be
based on an incomplete assessment of the historical record, which
in contrast indicates that; 1) the BEAR I report’s conclusion were
not biased when compared to contemporaneous reports prepared
for countries other than the US, 2) successive NAS committeesx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2016.01.039
51/& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article uactually dismissed the highest quantitative genetic risk estimates
of BEAR I, did not rely on Drosophila (fruit ﬂy) data, and had their
own views of the LNT model, 3) BEAR I had a negligible impact on
subsequent NAS reports starting as early as 1972, and 4), with or
without BEAR I, the LNT model would likely have been accepted in
the US for radiation protection purposes in the 1950s. In the Ap-
pendix, for completeness, I deal with speciﬁc charges of corruption
and political motivation. I also respond there to suggestions of bias
in early fruit ﬂy radiation studies carried out by Curt Stern and
collaborators. Additional comments can be found in an un-
published project report (Beyea, 2016).2. Bias and corruption
If the BEAR I committee were biased and corrupt, it is difﬁcult
to explain how other expert groups that the Calabrese article does
not discuss came to similar conclusions about the LNT model and
quantitative mutation risk. For instance, a detailed, 128-page re-
port from the UK Medical Research Council, prepared by promi-
nent UK scientists, coordinated to appear on the same date as the
US BEAR I report (Hamblin, 2007), came to similar conclusions
about the LNT model and genetic risks (MRC, 1956). There were
some differences in conclusions between the two reports, despite
attempts to remove them, but none relevant to the current dis-
cussion. For instance, the US panel focused on population genetic
risk and recommended cumulative dose limits for populations, not
just limits on individual exposure, whereas the UK panel focused
on individual genetic risk and made no dose limit recommenda-
tions for populations, viewing those as beyond its responsibility.
(Hamblin, 2007). Both panels supported the LNT model at low
doses. The UK report complements the BEAR I panel's semi-pop-
ular report by presenting the underlying citations and logic used
by the panel's geneticists in reaching their conclusions about ra-
diation risk.nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 1
Examples of pejorative attacks in the article, entitled, “On the origins of the linear no-threshold (LNT) dogma by means of untruths, artful dodges and blind faith.” (Emphasis
added).
1 “… personal and professional relationship with Muller that would markedly impact the LNT deception story..”
2 “…especially seen through the actions of the NAS BEAR I Genetics Panel in 1956 which assured the acceptance of the LNT by falsifying and fabricating the research
record, thereby constituting scientiﬁc misconduct at the highest possible level..”
3 “Stern’s unusual behavior makes sense when viewed as an attempt to blunt any challenge to the linear dose–response model (i.e., by demanding that the data of
Caspari not be accepted)”
4 “….of the threshold model at the Nobel Prize Lecture was deceptive and not without ideological underpinnings”
5 “As for Muller, he must have surely felt relief as he was spared the trouble of having to defend his highly deceptive comments at the Nobel Prize Lecture.”
6 “The strategy of Muller and Stern to deceive and obfuscate on the nature of the dose response in the low dose zone was successful.”
7 “Various leaders in the ﬁeld repeated false limitations of the Caspari study (Higgins, 1951; Jolly, 2004; Singleton, 1954) that were inspired by the deceptive comments
of Stern and Muller.”
8 “…ﬁndings may be understood within the context of his ideological focus on establishing the LNT model for risk assessment and in the preservation of his legacy – a
legacy that would have been severely tarnished if the deceptive remarks he made during his Nobel Prize Lecture had been discovered.”
9 “These actions of fabrication and falsiﬁcation by the Genetics Panel were undertaken to ensure that…”
10 “Following its acts of falsiﬁcation and fabrication of the research record, the Genetics Panel continued to show its arrogance in the aftermath of the BEAR I Panel….”
11 “Thus, the President of the NAS was complicit in the decision not to require the BEAR Genetics Panel to document its support of the LNT model.”
12 “The dishonesty of the Panel was nothing new as it was simply carrying on a tradition seeded a decade earlier by Hermann J. Muller at his Nobel Prize Lecture.”
13 “The explicit deceptions of some Panel members continued even some 35 years after the fact”
14 “..Glass bears false witness. Glass’s most signiﬁcant fabrication is that ….
15 “The consensus story was not real but faked by Weaver and the Panel”
16 “In the selection of panel members, one suspects that Bronk and Weaver may have intended to “stack the deck” with radiation geneticists who supported the LNT.
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up of a majority of continental Europeans, came to similar con-
clusions as the BEAR I genetics panel (WHO, 1957).
“This Group takes note of the report of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America and that of the Medical
Research Council of Great Britain.- … the Group notes the
substantial similarity of the ﬁndings and recommendations of
these reports and is in essential agreement with them” (WHO,
1957).
Whatever biases may or may not have existed in individual
members of the BEAR I genetics panel, they would appear to have
been washed away or balanced by the group process of debate and
negotiation. The panel's report reﬂected a broader consensus by
geneticists about the appropriateness of the LNT model for char-
acterizing genetic risks in humans at low doses of ionizing radia-
tion (Jolly, 2003).
Contemporary challenges to the LNT model for characterizing
genetic risks in humans were made by physicians and physicists,
rarely by geneticists (Jolly, 2003). In fact, geneticists tended to
challenge those proposing a threshold model (Jolly, 2003). The
concept of a single track of radiation causing damage to genes (i.e.,
the single-hit model) was a powerful theoretical concept. Unlike
chemical exposures, no metabolization was required to cause da-
mage. With fruit ﬂy and emerging mouse data perceived to sup-
port the single-hit model, the 1956 genetics panel “immediately
accepted the no-threshold principle for mutation production”
while arguing with great intensity about how dangerous such
mutations would, or would not be, to future generations (the so-
called Classical/Balance controversy) (Beatty, 1987; Seltzer, 2007).
In effect, they argued about the slope of a linear term, not the
existence of a threshold.
Professor Calabrese tries to draw a number of inferences from
transcripts of committee discussions and correspondence among
panel members that he located from archives or were quoted in
dissertations. Today, NAS staff members at public meetings caution
attendees to focus on the ﬁnal recommendations and conclusions,
not on comments made by individual members of NAS committees
during meetings. Committee members often ask questions or
make comments that do not necessarily indicate their positions on
particular subjects; they may change their minds on particular
issues during the course of debate; and they often end up nego-
tiating report language to produce a document they can all agree
to. Responses to the charges made by Professors Calabreseconcerning the BEAR I genetics panel have been published else-
where by the current president of NAS and other NAS staff
members (Cicerone and Crowley, 2014; Crowley et al., 2015).3. Views on genetic risk estimates by subsequent NAS
committees
How well have the judgments made by the 1956–1957 panels
held up over time, now that very good datasets concerning the
effects of ionizing radiation on large numbers of humans are
available? For the LNT model, rather well. NAS panels have never
doubted linearity of radiation induced genetic mutations, although
they have accepted the data-driven idea of a slope that is reduced
at low dose rates. As for cancer induction, successive NAS BEIR
committees (NAS, 1972, 1990, 2006; Reissland, 1981) have become
increasingly supportive of the LNT model, ﬁrst treating the LNT
model for cancer as a conservative approach for characterizing
risks for radiation protection purposes, and today treating it as the
best biologic model for characterizing both solid cancer and ge-
netic risks in humans.
Estimates of genetic risk can also be compared to judgments
made in later NAS reports. The 1956 Committee reported two
separate estimates of risk, one for the ﬁrst generation of offspring
based on the estimated “doubling dose,” and the second estimate
for cumulative damage out to many generations. (Doubling dose is
the amount of ionizing radiation given generation after generation
that produces as many gene mutations that arise spontaneously.)
Based on a comparison with the 2006 NAS BEIR (Biological Effects
of Ionizing Radiation) VII report, the BEAR I genetics panel did well
on its assessment of the mutation doubling dose. The range of
doubling dose presented by the BEAR I genetics panel, 5–150 r,
includes the value recommended by the BEIR VII committee (NAS,
2006), 1 Gy (approximately 100 r), which is a good result for a
prediction made more than 50 years ago. The panel's estimate of
the fraction of detrimental impacts seen in the ﬁrst generation
after a radiation dose is also roughly in agreement (within a factor
of approximately 2) compared to later estimates (see Table 2).
The estimate made by six members of the BEAR I genetics panel
for cumulative number of mutations over many generations from a
single radiation exposure, the calculation that caused the greatest
disagreement within the panel, was not estimated in later reports,
because the gene-counting methods used were thought difﬁcult to
translate usefully into societal cost and human suffering (NAS,
Table 2
Comparison of risk metrics for radiation induced genetic damage that were made in 1956, 1990, and 2006 by panels of the (US) National Academy of Sciences.
Damage metric 1956 NAS (BEAR I)a 1990 NAS (BEIR V)b 2006 NAS (BEIR VII)c
Threshold 0 0 0
Doubling dose 50 (5–150)d,e 1 1
Original value
Units Roentgen (r) Gy Gy
Approximate value in 1956 dose units (r) 50 (5–150) 100 100
Damage from single 10 r dose in ﬁrst generation
Original Value 50,000f 6–35 3000–4700
Units 108 offspring Extra cases per 106 liveborn offspring per rem Risk per Gy per 106 Progeny
Value matching BEAR-1 dose and number of
offspring
50,000 6000–35,000g 30,000–47,000
Total number of mutations passed on from single
10 r dose
5,000,000h No estimate No estimate
a NAS 1956, pp. 24–26.
b Table 2–1 in NAS 1990.
c Table 4–6 in NAS 2006.
d “Thus various arguments reduce the 5–150 r range, and several experienced geneticists have recently made estimates in the narrower range of 30–80 r”.
e I have taken, 50 r, as the middle of the range for this comparison.
f Tangible inherited defects.
g Excluding congenital abnormalities, which in worst case was 10,000.
h Estimate by 6 panel members, only. A number of geneticists on the 1956 genetics panel did not think this to be a meaningful calculation, for the same reason that
subsequent panels gave, namely that the numbers are not easily translated into societal cost and human suffering (NAS, 1956, p. 26).
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1956 genetics panel that thought that.
“…this kind of estimate is not a meaningful one to certain
geneticists. Their principal reservation is doubtless a feeling
that, hard as it is to estimate numbers of mutants, it is much
harder still, at the present state of knowledge, to translate this
over into a recognizable statement of harm to individual per-
sons.” (NAS, 1956), p. 26.
In the absence of later, more realistic, calculations with which
to compare, it is not possible to tell if the þ/ factor of ten un-
certainty assigned to the 1956 estimate would bracket results from
later models. Still, the 1956 BEIR I genetics panel got at least three
out of four of its quantitative calculations reasonably consistent
with current estimates made by subsequent NAS committees,
namely the dose threshold (zero), the doubling dose, and the es-
timate of damage in the ﬁrst generation resulting from a single
exposure.
Professor Calabrese complains in his article that the true un-
certainty in the cumulative population damage estimates was
greater than a factor of 7 10. I agree with him, preferring 7 30,
which is a value consistent with his calculation. I agree because
the full uncertainty in the panel’s estimate was only obliquely
noted in the report, referred to as “widely different extreme ran-
ges” with no quantiﬁcation presented. Nevertheless, deciding on
how to present scientiﬁc uncertainty to a lay audience is always a
balancing act, and different groups may choose different solutions.
However, a perceived weakness in the presentation of uncertainty
is not sufﬁcient grounds to condemn the entire report. In any case,
Professor Calabrese's complaint about the BEAR I multi-generation
mutation estimate is largely moot: 1) the published estimate was
presented tentatively and with dissent noted, 2) it does not appear
to have had much inﬂuence on subsequent research or radiation
protection policies, and 3) the estimate was not used in developing
the recommendations of the panel.
“…in the end the numerical recommendation was based al-
most entirely on the amount of background radiation. Genetic
calculations had little inﬂuence.” (Crow, 1989).I have seen nothing in the literature I cite, or anywhere else,
that suggests that the published damage estimate (or the doubling
dose estimate for that matter) had any effect on public policy or
public opinion. For instance, these estimates were not reported in
the news story about the BEAR-I report that appeared in the New
York Times on the day of publication; the Times article focused its
attention on the absence of a risk threshold by the genetics panel
and the statement of life shortening made by a different panel
(pathology panel) (New York Times, 6/13/1956). The entire BEAR I
report, though, was printed in the newspaper.
The reports of the panel were particularly newsworthy and
inﬂuential in affecting public opinion because they appeared to
contradict the position of the US Atomic Energy Commission
(USAEC) that there were no health issues associated with radiation
fallout and possibly that there would be a hormesis effect (Creager,
2015; Hamblin, 2007; Seltzer, 2007). The prospects for high media
attention were determined from the beginning of deliberations of
the BEAR I panel because its members immediately agreed that
the LNT model was appropriate for low dose radiation exposures
and moved on to other issues.4. Impact of BEAR I on subsequent NAS reports
In addition to saying that the BEAR report was corrupt and
biased, the Calabrese article charges, without documentation, that
successive NAS panels were duped into following the 1956 BEAR-I
report’s conclusions regarding the LNT model. Having myself
served on nine NAS committees and experienced the vigorous
debate process that is characteristic of these bodies, I ﬁnd it dif-
ﬁcult to imagine that any NAS committee would march in lock step
with a previous committee, let alone one from 1956. Most likely,
the ﬁve decades of data acquired after the BEAR-I report was
published, including data from mice (Dubrova et al., 1998; Russell
and Kelly, 1982), A-bomb survivors (Neel and Schull, 1991), and
Chernobyl families (Dubrova, 2003), were more inﬂuential in de-
termining the opinions of subsequent NAS BEIR committees, in-
cluding the most recent BEIR VII committee (NAS, 2006), which
presents some 500 pages of data and supporting analyses to
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Furthermore, NAS committees began distancing themselves
from some of the estimates in the BEAR-I report by 1972. The 1972
BEIR committee (NAS, 1972), asked to conduct a fresh look at ra-
diation effects, noted that knowledge of genetics had been re-
volutionized since the BEAR I report was published. Studies of
mutations in male mice showed no evidence of a dose threshold
(Russell, 1965). The 1972 NAS Committee concluded that the ge-
netic risks estimates in 1956 were “probably on the high and
therefore conservative side,” but there were far too many un-
certainties to be dogmatic.
So, the high historical estimates of such great concern to Pro-
fessor Calabrese today had already been addressed by NAS Com-
mittees more than forty years earlier. As for the LNT model, the
1972 committee had its own views and saw the model as a con-
servative and practical approach:
“…the use of a non-linear hypothesis for estimating risks in
support of public policy on radiation protection would be im-
practical in the present state of knowledge, since it would re-
quire consideration of individual variations in temporal and
spatial distribution of tissue dose, as well as allowance for other
variables which cannot be analyzed at this time.”
Professor Calabrese has challenged the validity of certain arti-
cles about x-ray induced mutations in fruit ﬂies published before
1956 on which the BEAR-I report relied. He claimed that there was
data suggesting a dose-response threshold (see Appendix for a
counterview). The 1972 BEIR panel was aware of this possibility:
“Some Drosophila [fruit ﬂy] data suggest a threshold, but there
is good evidence that at least some of the effect has linear re-
lationship to dose.”
But, putting aside for the moment whether or not Drosophila
data is relevant to current thinking about linearity, was the 1956
BEAR-I panel wrong or right about the fruit ﬂy data as seen from
today’s fruit ﬂy studies? It is apparently still a difﬁcult question to
resolve, as even today the cautionary statement by the 1972 panel
seems appropriate. Some modern fruit ﬂy studies show linearity
down to doses 50 times lower than those used in fruit ﬂy studies
of the BEAR-I period and low enough to match doses of concern
for routine radiation protection (Schweizer, 1995); yet some show
threshold-like effects at much higher doses, such as a series of
studies carried out by a research arm of the Japanese Electric
Power Industry (Koana et al., 2012). (In the 2012 Koana study,
some endpoints showed a U-shaped dose response (e.g., for so-
called, small spots of mutant cells on Drosophila wings), but others
showed linearity (e.g. for large spots).).
Fruit ﬂy data are no longer used for estimates in NAS reports.
The 1972 BEIR Committee relied primarily on mouse and human
data for its risk estimates for genetic diseases. Also, the 1972 BEIR
committee and its successors concluded that somatic (e.g. cancer)
risks were more important for radiation protection than genetic
risks, reducing the importance of any type of genetic data in ra-
diation protection. Therefore, any debate about the strengths and
limitations of the fruit ﬂy studies used by the 1956 BEAR I panel,
which makes up a good part of Professor Calabrese's article, is not
relevant to 1972 and later NAS BEIR reports.
The 1990 NAS BEIR committee was the ﬁrst to base its esti-
mates solely on human data. It had the following comments about
the BEAR-I genetics panel:
“The doubling dose range given by the BEAR Committee would
now be considered to apply to acute radiation. It must be re-
membered that at the time that the BEAR report was written,
neither the dose-rate effect nor the distinction between pre-
meiotic and postmeiotic cell stage response to radiation wereknown.”
The latest NAS report, BEIR VII (2006), was also dismissive of
the 1956 BEAR I report, saying that its quantitative estimates were
“nothing more than educated guesses.” Thus, once again, Professor
Calabrese's claim that successive panels followed the BEAR-I re-
port is not validated.
The NAS (2006) BEIR VII report concluded, based on then-
current data and understanding of radiation biology, that the dose-
response model for cancer was linear at low doses:
“A comprehensive review of the biology data led the committee
to conclude that the risk would continue in a linear fashion at
lower doses without a threshold and that the smallest dose has
the potential to cause a small increase in risk to humans.”
The 2006 BEIR VII report notes that a dose-rate effectiveness
factor (DREF) of 3 has been used in post-1970 NAS BEIR reports to
extrapolate downward high dose-rate mouse genetic mutation
data to low dose-rates for genetic mutations. (In contrast, the BEIR
VII report recommended a DREF of 1.5 for solid cancer). Although
subsequent panels of the NAS have downgraded the magnitude of
genetic risks, they have steadily increased the LNT slope for cancer
effects.
The 2006 NAS BEIR VII report devotes a chapter to radiation
hormesis, the model championed by Professor Calabrese. In fact,
Professor Calabrese is listed as having made a presentation to the
BEIR VII Committee, but his arguments for hormesis were not
adopted. Furthermore, the 2006 BEIR VII committee considered
models other than hormesis, including supralinearity, which posits
that radiation induced genomic instability and bystander effects
increase cancer risks at low doses relative to the LNT model
(Morgan and Sowa, 2009). In its analysis, the 2006, NAS Com-
mittee (BEIR VII) considered all the studies available at the time
that Calabrese and other hormesis supporters were convinced
invalidated the LNT, as well as studies supporting the antithetical
view, namely, supralinearity. The committee, which consisted of 17
experts from universities and research institutions, found that the
bulk of the available studies and biological reasoning supported
the LNT model. I note that the committee's draft report was re-
viewed by yet another 16 experts.
Supporters of hormesis claim that studies since 2005 have
changed the situation. So, too, do supporters of the LNT, but they
claim the change is in favor of the LNT. They point to the post-
2006 epidemiological studies on cancer incidence and mortality.
These include the latest results from A-bomb survivor studies as
well as studies on over 600,000 radiationworkers. For a listing and
discussion of these studies, see (Beyea, 2012). Risk estimates from
these post-2005 studies are consistent with or higher than pre-
vious studies. For example, the most recent worker study (Leuraud
et al., 2015), with 300,000 subjects, reported direct estimates of
a linear risk per unit of protracted dose for blood cancers in ranges
“typical of environmental, diagnostic medical, and occupational
exposure.”.5. LNT and radiation protection
The impact of the BEAR I report on the subsequent adoption of
the LNT model for radiation protection should not be overstated.
Ron Kathren, no friend of the LNT model,, attributed the in-
troduction of this model to a 1954 Report (No. 17) by the National
Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP), followed by a similar
proposal by the British in 1955 (Kathren, 1996):
“In place of the tolerance dose, Report No. 17 introduced the
concept of the maximum permissible dose (MPD). Implicit in
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threshold model, the basis for which were the observations of
linearity in genetic mutations in Drosophila melanogaster
which, for protection purposes, were assumed to also apply to
somatic mutations.”
The BEAR-I report was issued two years after NCRP report 17
was published. Report 17 used the same starting assumptions
challenged by Professor Calabrese as biased and corrupted. Kath-
ren does not even mention the BEAR I report, let alone suggest it
played any signiﬁcant role in developing or maintaining the new
paradigm of linearity. Given the NCRP’s role in advising the US
government on radiation protection standards, it seems quite
likely that the LNT model would have been adopted for radiation
protection purposes in the United States even if BEAR I had never
been published.
On the other hand, BEAR-I did have a role, along with the In-
ternational Commission on Radiation Protection and the NCRP, in
reducing limits on worker exposure to radiation (Taylor, 1957),
limits that still hold today. The acceptance of the LNT model for
radiation protection did not bar radiation exposure for workers or
members of the public. The BEAR-I report also inﬂuenced the
politics of the time, elevating public concerns about radioactive
fallout from nuclear weapons testing, thus helping to bring about
the adoption of the atmospheric test ban treaty. The BEAR I report
also heightened fears about ionizing radiation exposure regardless
of its magnitude (Crow, 1987; Crow, 1995). Contrasted with the
USAEC’s denial of any effect, the BEAR I report apparently in-
creased public suspicion of government on radiation issues
(Creager, 2015; Hamblin, 2007).
What is often lost in disputes over radiation dose response
models is that risks at the low dose levels that are being debated
are also low, whether assessed using a linear, supralinear, or
threshold model. That means large differences in risk estimates
can be expected in study results, including contradictory differ-
ences, particularly when sample sizes are small. Human radiation
biology is not physics; experiments cannot ethically be done on
people. Scientists must rely on non-human data, for example
biomarkers of debatable importance in cells irradiated in vitro,
and/or “opportunistic” exposure situations where individual ex-
posures and their uncertainties may only be roughly known. Fur-
thermore, human health outcomes of interest (e.g., cancer) arise
long after a radiation exposure is received, increasing the number
of variables that can modify causation. And such health outcomes
can have a number of other contributors besides radiation, redu-
cing the “signal to noise” ratio, as the radiation dose declines. As a
result of such limitations, there is some evidence that can be found
in some studies for virtually any dose-response function at low
doses.
Expert committees established by scientiﬁc organizations like
the NAS, usually at the request of government agencies or legis-
latures, are charged with weighing all available evidence in ad-
dressing their study mandates, including contradictory evidence,
which they do in detail. Weighing evidence requires subjective
judgments, so committee reports are unlikely to please every
scientiﬁc constituency.
Moreover, different committees can reach different conclu-
sions. For example, a 2005 French Academy of Sciences/National
Academy of Medicine report was skeptical of the LNT model for
radiation protection against cancer, particularly, when it came to
balancing risks from diagnostic radiation exposures against the
medical risks of avoiding diagnostic testing (Tubiana, 2005).
The process used by NAS committees to weigh the relevant
evidence and develop consensus reports through discussion and
negotiation contrasts with approaches taken by partisans of var-
ious theories; they tend to assess studies that agree with theirviews by the study's strengths and assess studies that disagree
with them by the study's weaknesses. Scientiﬁc partisans have an
important role to play in science by challenging prevailing views,
but not by launching character attacks.
A new NAS panel on the biological effects of radiation is in the
planning stage (http://dels.nas.edu/), so advocates of hormesis and
other models can expect to have another opportunity to make
their cases in the not-too-distant future. For the moment, when an
attempt is made to quantify risks in a low dose range, all views on
dose response can be incorporated by taking a linear response as
the centroid, with uncertainty bands broadened to incorporate the
theories of both hormesis and supralinearity (Beyea, 2012).Appendix
1) Did the BEAR-I panel bias its views to gain funding for in-
dividual's research, as Dr. Calabrese charges? The main argument
against this claim is given in the text, namely that the report was
not biased in the ﬁrst place. But the charge is also invalid when it
comes to the details on which the inference was based, for the
charge is based on an unrepresentative sample from the historical
record and it ignores the context of the times. I have never been on
a panel of scientists who didn't think that more research was a
social good. That does not translate into corruption. Furthermore,
the disparaging quotes from Dobzhansky and Demeric used in the
article, which contained talk of bending views to increase research
dollars, were made a year after the BEAR-I report was published,
making them of questionable relevance. And Dobzhansky did not
even serve on the ﬁrst BEAR panel, only the second one. In addi-
tion, the quotes cited in Calabrese came from one faction in the
debate, namely those who supported low risk numbers, not from
panel members like Muller and others who supported high risk
numbers.
It should also be noted that the research fund being discussed
in the correspondence was a proposal of one of the correspon-
dents, namely Demeric, who wrote that he thought more research
was necessary before geneticists should give risk estimates (Selt-
zer, 2007), p 305. He worried that traditional funding would lead
to a dissipation of effort. It was Dobzhansky, Muller's main sci-
entiﬁc antagonist, who wrote about a willingness to bend his
views a bit. In contrast to Dobzhansky, Jolly argues that Muller was
concerned in the debate about the effect on the public and policy
debates over radiation exposure, not funding (Jolly, 2003), p 305.
Moreover, it was Dobzhansky who was charged at the time to have
“bent [his] interpretation of experimental results to get money out
of the AEC [U.S Atomic Energy Commission].” (Lewontin et al.,
2001; Seltzer, 2007, p 450). (Readers should be skeptical of all such
mutterings about the ethics of scientiﬁc competitors, whether
expressed in the past or today.).
To provide additional balance to Professor Calabrese's analysis,
it is only necessary to go to his main published sources for nega-
tive quotations about the 1956 panel, which include fascinating
Ph.D. theses by Michael Seltzer and J. Christorpher Jolly, as well as
an equally fascinating article by historian Jacob Hamblin. Most
radiation genetics work, including that of a number of BEAR-I
panelists, was funded by the US Atomic Energy Commission
(USAEC), which was not objective about the results it wanted to
see, according to Seltzer and Hamblin, and was not adverse to
promoting a “hormesis-like” model.
“…with the public controversy over radiation hazards, it be-
came the undeviating goal of the AEC to justify scientiﬁcally the
position that fallout and low levels of radiation pose no threat
to humans, and might even be beneﬁcial genetically.” (Seltzer,
2007) p. 290.
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nuisance to the USAEC. Seltzer and other sources (Beatty, 1987;
Hamblin, 2007) indicate that in 1955, the USAEC blocked Muller
from giving a paper on the genetic hazards of radiation at the
United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Use of
Atomic Energy held in Geneva. Muller nevertheless was able to
attend as an observer and received a standing ovation, according
to a contemporary (Hamblin, 2007).
Seltzer goes on to state that, in general, the USAEC “…sought to
dominate all the relevant committees, government and in-
dependent, that were formed to study and/or recommend policy
on radiation exposure limits.”.
In a similar vein, Hamblin argues that this attempt to dominate
committees extended to the BEAR-I panel; he claims that the panel
was not truly independent of the USAEC, with USAEC scientists on
many panels and subpanels and holding the keys to much im-
portant data. In direct contradiction to Calabrese's claims about
the direction of NAS bias, Hamblin argues that the NAS staff was
too solicitous of the USAEC; that the staff allowed the USAEC to
negotiate with the panel about content (e.g. commenting on
drafts). However, Hamblin still had praise for the report itself:
“This is not to say that the BEAR report itself was a whitewash;
quite the contrary, it was scientiﬁc negotiation at its most
successful. For a brief moment, it balanced the goals and ex-
pectations of a host of interests. But the results of the report
were used repeatedly by the USAEC and the Eisenhower ad-
ministration to play down the risks of fallout by calling them
minute additions to the bath of natural radiation in which
humans already lived.”
Thus, from my reading of the Seltzer dissertation, the Jolly
dissertation and the historical analysis of Hamblin, a different
picture emerges than the one Calabrese paints. Anyone at the time
who took a view opposite to the USAEC on fallout risk was po-
tentially vulnerable to loss of funding or loss of future opportunity
of funding. And, the USAEC would have appeared to have been
watching, given the USAEC-friendly scientists on the genetics pa-
nel, including Shields Warren, the former head of the USAEC’s
Division of Biology and Medicine (1948–1952), who had “authored
the USAEC's basic assumptions” (Hamblin, 2007). From this
broader viewpoint the panel exhibited courage in my view when it
deviated from the USAEC party line by insisting that the potential
genetic risks of radiation exposure had to be stressed in the report.
In an unpublished project report (Beyea, 2016), I have offered
responses to criticisms of historical ﬁgures by Professor Calabrese
not covered here that I deem unfair, but which have minor re-
levance to the key issues under debate. I do so because a defense
of these individuals (including, Bentley Glass, Warren Weaver,
James Crow, Hermann Muller, and Detlev Bronk) is warranted in
face of the prosecutorial case made in the Calabrese article.
2) Did political considerations lead to a biased BEAR-I report?
Once again, the BEAR-I report was not biased when compared to
other reviews in that period. Nevertheless, when NAS panels are
given controversial topics, it is impossible for political implications
to be completely avoided, which is one reason that negotiations
over language can get heated and can be time consuming; it is also
one reason why the NAS tries to bring balance to committees
through the appointment process. Like most NAS committees, a
wide range of scientiﬁc viewpoints, including scientiﬁc-political
viewpoints, was represented among the 16 members of the BEAR-I
genetics committee, leading to extensive disputes before a con-
sensus was reached (Beatty, 1987; Beatty, 2006; Crow, 1995; Jolly,
2003). Obtaining agreement required compromise and the inclu-
sion of multiple points of view in the ﬁnal document. However,
not all points of scientiﬁc view can be included in NAS committeesto keep their sizes workable. The idea of effects going to zero at a
ﬁnite dose for genetic effects (Calabrese’s claim) was not a debate
of the day. The absence of a threshold was a widely accepted view
in the genetics community at the time for genetic (but not ne-
cessarily somatic) effects (Jolly, 2003; Kathren, 1996); the big de-
bate at the time was whether all mutations induced by fallout
radiation would have a negative effect on the genetic makeup (as
Muller and supporters argued) or whether increased variance
could signiﬁcantly moderate the damage component (as Dobz-
hansky and his supporters argued) (Crow, 1987; Hamblin, 2007;
Seltzer, 2007). Calabrese may think from his present-day vantage
point that the 1956 BEAR I panel was debating the wrong question,
but, with the exception of Ralph Singleton, who studied corn,
there was little concern about the validity of the LNT model among
geneticists of the era, and even Singleton had muted his concern
by late 1955 based on his evolving studies (Jolly, 2003; Konzak and
Singleton, 1956). (Singleton served on the 1956 BEAR I agriculture
panel, which assessed the impact on food supplies of nuclear
weapons fallout.)
Later NAS committees would take on the question of the va-
lidity of the LNT model. In fact, for the 1980 report, consensus
broke down and two minority reports were prepared, one sug-
gesting pure linearity for cancer, one supporting a pure quadratic
dose response (Marshall, 1979). The remainder of the committee
supported a mid-view, namely a linear-quadratic response, which
was linear at the lowest doses, but with a reduced slope. Sub-
sequent committees went back to the linear cancer model, based
on the evolving data situation.
At the BEAR-I genetics panel meetings, the debate was not
about linearity; it was about the strength of the association. Both
sides were represented, with Sewall Wright and others as surro-
gates for Dobzhansky. Both positions were represented in the ﬁnal
document to prevent a break down in consensus (Crow, 1995). I
note that, although Dobzhansky was not able to serve on the ﬁrst
panel, he did ﬁnd time to serve on the second BEAR panel (NAS,
1960), which supported the recommendations of the ﬁrst panel.
Nevertheless, had Dobzhansky been able to participate in the 1956
panel, based on my experience with such panels, I expect that the
report’s text would have had further explication of his views than
were actually incorporated.
Both Dozbransky and Muller were aware of political implica-
tions of their ideas, according to historian, John Beatty:
“Dobzhansky and Muller both appealed to the dangers of
misguided social policy that might have resulted from prema-
turely resolving their controversy in the other’s favor. They
called for high empirical standards on those grounds, more
than once seeking to forestall the resolution of their dispute in
this way.” (Beatty, 1987).
In casting aspersions about Muller's politics, Professor Calabr-
ese does not give an objective picture of Muller, a brilliant but
complex ﬁgure (Beatty, 1987; Crow, 1995; Crow, 2005; Paul, 1988).
According to these authors Muller was concerned about the effects
of fallout on the gene pool, but he supported the US having nuclear
weapons and was initially wary of an atmospheric test ban be-
cause he was more afraid of the Soviet Union than nuclear
weapons. He also was a supporter of eugenics. Dobzhansky, too,
was complex and a larger-than-life ﬁgure in biology. Like most
scientists, Muller and Dobzhansky had their personal strengths
and weaknesses.
3) Were key scientiﬁc papers by Curt Stern and collaborators
fraudulent and did Stern try to deceive the scientiﬁc community?.
The idea that a man like Stern (see Neel (1983) for an appre-
ciation) would deliberately deceive the scientiﬁc community
leaves me dumbstruck. Nevertheless, Professor Calabrese has
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collaborators (Caspari and Stern, 1948; Spencer and Stern, 1948;
Uphoff and Stern, 1949) were inﬂuenced by Muller and dishonestly
presented. Calabrese's work has spawned similar criticisms of this
pre-1960 Drosophila (fruit ﬂy) data (Siegel et al., 2016). Based on
his review of correspondence, Calabrese concluded that the paper
by Caspari and Stern was the best of the lot and the rest should
have been discounted as ﬂawed. In contrast, Stern saw to it that all
three papers were published. Dr. Calabrese stated that the Caspari
paper supported a threshold dose response, which is incorrect. The
paper was a test of dose-rate independence; there was no ques-
tioning of linearity for one-time exposures. The paper was a test of
the single-hit theory.
“If the result turns out to be correct, it would necessitate a
revision of the classical hit theory of induction of mutations.”
(Uphoff and Stern, 1949).
Three possible revisions to the classical theory are listed in the
paper, only one of which is a dose-rate threshold response. The
other two are 1) a multi-hit model, and 2) a repair model. A repair
model might be closest to the current practice of using a dose-rate
effectiveness factor (DREF) for low-dose exposures, or, perhaps a
fourth category should have been added. In the summary paper by
Uphoff and Stern, published in Science, which analyzed all three
data sets, the authors state.
“Viewing all experiments together, it appears that irradiation at
low dosages, administered at low intensity, induces mutations
in Drosophila sperm. There is no threshold below which ra-
diation fails to induce mutations.”
Unlike, Professor Calabrese, upon reviewing the paper, I found
the interpretation reasonable, as the Science reviewers must have.
All three data sets show an increase over controls, although the
data set preferred by Professor Calabrese shows a high p-value
(0.29), but that does not mean the effect was zero. Looking at the
effects value for all three studies, the combined data suggest to
me, and apparently to Caspari and Stern and the Science re-
viewers, that it was not necessary to invoke any of the three
proposed alternatives to the single-hit theory. Possibly, invoking a
DREF, which later became the norm, would have improved the
comparison of the three studies.
Based on my review of Professor Calabrese's objectivity as a
historical analyst of matters related to thresholds, and given the
fact that the Stern papers take up 20 linear feet in the archives of
the American Philosophical Society, I am skeptical of his claim that
a full reading of the Stern/Muller correspondence reveals that they
allowed any of the papers to be published knowing there was a
fatal ﬂaw. All papers, of course, have weaknesses, which are
usually discussed within research groups before publication. Not
all of the discussion appears in correspondence; some of it occurs
in face-to-face and telephone conversations. In any case, it would
be helpful if Professor Calabrese would put up on the web the
correspondence that he collected, as well as the correspondence
he cited, so that others could make their own judgments about the
serious attacks he has made to the reputations of major ﬁgures in
radiation biology.
Professor Calabrese speculates that the lead author for the
Caspari and Stern paper must have been unhappy with the re-
solution proposed in the summary paper in Science. Yet in 1979,
Caspari professed pride in the three papers that Calabrese dis-
cusses, including the two that Calabrese denigrates, saying that
this work formed “the basis of our present knowledge of muta-
genic radiation effects.(Seltzer, 2007), footnote 211 p. 286.” In any
case, these three papers were published years before the BEAR I
report, so they were neither the responsibility of the BEAR-Igenetics panel nor NAS. And another paper supportive of dose-rate
independence was published before the panel ﬁnished its work
(Luning et al., 1955).
In conclusion, the historical record is so rich and complicated
that it can support multiple competing narratives depending, for
instance, on how extreme a ﬁlter is applied to it, the agenda that
the ﬁltering is meant to serve, and how conspiratorial the analyst
wants to get, especially if use is made of inferences about motives.
Humans are complex, with multiple motives, known and un-
known, which inﬂuence their decisions. Once motives are fair
game, where does it stop? What about the motives of Muller's
competitors, e.g., Dobzhansky and Wright? What about the mo-
tives of analysts, such as Seltzer, Hamblim, Calabrese, and myself?
There is no scientiﬁc way to unravel motives and their inﬂuence.
Let such discussions occur in history and political science journals,
where readers and reviewers are versed in the methods of his-
torical analysis.References
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